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Coalitions and counter-coalitions in online contestation: an analysis of the German and 
British climate change debate
Mobilization goes along with counter-mobilization, ideas trigger counter-ideas and coalitions
struggle with counter-coalitions.  Political  contestation is  – at  least  – a two-sided process.
However, the strength of the competing camps in pushing forward their agenda varies along
an axis of different conflict configurations. At one extreme, the political contest is defined by
opposing camps with equal potential to influence public opinion, mass media and the institu-
tional process. At the other extreme, political conflict is characterized by a dominant coalition
and their master frame, while counter-voices are hardly visible and lack institutional access.
Such a situation is labelled a 'policy monopoly' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 6f.).
Traditionally, political contestation has been shaped by national elites. Policy studies have
primarily focused on political elites and their impact on policy formulation whereas studies
on mass media have revealed that media follow the constellation among the political elite:
they tend to neglect issues not raised by national political elites (Author) and hardly articulate
dissenting positions if there is a consensus among the elite  (Bennett, 1990). If social move-
ments and other 'challengers' (Kriesi, 2004) have come into focus of research, they have been
shown to face difficulties entering the political process as well as traditional media (Bennett,
1990; Wolfsfeld, 1997). 
Today, however, the Internet opens up a new venue for political contestation that has been as-
sociated with hopes for a 'democratic reconfiguration and redistribution of traditional sources
of news and information on a global scale' (Kellner and Pierce, 2008: 393). This reconfigura-
tion is based on the idea that the Internet with its low access barriers breaks the monopoly of
traditional media to decide what is relevant for a society and opens up new possibilities for
non-elite actors to raise their voices (Benkler, 2006). In such a 'hybrid media system' (Chad-
wick, 2013) the different channels of communication are intertwined and civil society ac-
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tivists and public officials try to promote their positions and frames both through traditional
media as well as through all types of online media. As a wide variety of different actor types
are connected in such a networked public sphere, ideas from outside the political elite may
have a chance to diffuse more easily (e.g. Benkler et al. 2013). However, recently, it has been
noted that this shift of power in public contestation away from traditional media and political
elites may also spur anti-democratic, anti-liberal as well as post-factual voices (e.g. Benkler
et al., 2017). 
In our study we seek to understand the role of the Internet in settings characterized by policy
monopolies. Policy monopolies consist of a dominant coalition of elite (and non-elite) actors
that is able to define the agenda, whereas the counter-coalition is weak and invisible. As the
Internet expands the public sphere, does it allow counter-coalitions to successfully challenge
the status of dominant policy constellations or does it reflect traditional power constellations?
To answer this question, we seek to (1) identify coalitions and counter-coalitions on the Web
and to analyse  (2)  how these  coalitions  differ  resource-wise and where  these differences
come from. To do so, we rely on a unique dataset on  actor relationships in hyperlink net-
works, as well as on the content discussed within these networks, which helps us describe the
political position, type and geographical location of the actors. We compare such networks
originating from German and British civil society actors over the course of 11 months in the
field of climate change – two countries in which those warning of the negative consequences
of man-made climate change hold a policy monopoly. 
The contributions of this study are two-fold: First, instead of studying mobilization and con-
testation among a specific actor type (e.g. for blogs Adamic and Glance, 2005; Elgesem et al.,
2015; e.g. political elites Park et al., 2004; Shumate, 2012; e.g. for NGOs Simpson, 2015) we
adopt a link-tracing approach that incorporates a variety of these actors. Such an approach al-
lows us to analyze how elite and non-elite actors mobilize together or against each other and
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how national and transnational dimensions are intertwined (see also Elgin, 2015). Second,
our study contributes theoretically and empirically to defining coalitions on the Web and to
measuring their resources taking the two- or multi-sided nature of political contestation into
account. We thereby follow an approach that starts out from actors’ political positions asking
whether they are underpinned by linking behavior instead of relying on community detection
algorithms that take hyperlinks as their starting point (e.g Elgesem et al., 2015).
Online (Counter-) Coalitions
In recent times, coalitions have been analysed online. Benkler et al. (2013) for example study
the emergence of a coalition against the online piracy act in the US and Bennett and Segeberg
(2013) also interpret movement networks as coalitions. In this vein, also Pilny and Shumate
(2012) show that NGO hyperlinks are used to collective identity formation reflecting offline
alliances among the involved actors (also Simpson, 2015). All  of these studies, however,
analyse online coalitions without taking the opponent side of contestation into account. Con-
sequently, while these studies are able to shed light on the mobilization processes of social
movement organizations, their one-sided focus fails to reveal the more complex dynamics
generated by the interplay of proponents and opponents. These configurations have only re-
cently been given attention. Based on community detection algorithms, Elgesem et al. (2015)
for example show that climate change skeptical and advocate communities exist in the blogo-
sphere. Yet, such an approach – if used for coalition identification – is based on the premise
that links reveal coalitions. As links may have different meanings (for summaries De Maeyer,
2012; Pilny and Shumate, 2012),  Elgesem et al. (2015) question in how far the identified
communities fully present communities in a social sense. Building on but also departing from
these studies, we start out from a theoretical notion of coalitions that describes them in a so-
cial sense demarcating them based on their ideological core that is then underpinned by their
connective fabric. To do so, we draw on Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier,
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1988;  Sabatier  and Weible,  2007) as  it  offers  a  definition  of  coalitions  that  can well  be
adapted to online settings (see also Elgin, 2015) and is fully interpretable in a social sense.
Following this framework, a coalition is formed (1) in response to concrete policy issues and
(2) comprises different types of actors such as  political actors, lobbyists and administrative
agencies, but also journalists, scientific representatives, non-profit organizations and private
consultants. It is constituted by a shared belief system (3) which is characterized by core (pol-
icy) beliefs defining the general direction in which a coalition seeks to push policy programs.
Coalition allies agree on such core beliefs (which are very hard to change) whereas variation
occurs as regards the secondary strategic aspects, i.e. the instrumental decisions and framings
surrounding these core beliefs. The ideological core of such coalitions is underpinned by (4) a
non-trivial degree of internal coordination and by (5) some stability over time.i 
This approach is well suited to study coalitions in online contestation as web researchers also
apply an issue-specific logic (1) to draw boundaries for the investigation of the potentially
endless  web  (e.g.  Ackland  and  O'Neil,  2011;  Rogers  and  Marres,  2000) and  as  online
contestation is shaped by a multitude of actors (e.g. bloggers, NOGs, politicians or media)
(2). Beyond, core beliefs (3) are clearly formulated by actors on the web (e.g. Elgin, 2015)
and become visible in the documents published. In addition,  hyperlinks being part of the
connective  fabric  of the web (Gerlitz  and Helmond, 2013) indicate  public  expressions of
affiliations (Fu and Shumate, 2016) or citation links (Adamic and Glance, 2005) and as such
might be useful to analyse coalitions’ coordination (4). Although there is evidence that such
hyperlinks carry many meanings in different settings, researchers have shown that they are
especially frequent among like-minded actors. It is actors with similar political positions, who
stem from the same party, work on similar issue or come from the same geographical area
that are more closely connected (e.g. Ackland and O'Neil, 2011; Adamic and Glance, 2005;
Gonzalez-Bailón,  2009;  Himelboim  et  al.,  2013;  Kim  et  al.,  2010;  Park  et  al.,  2004;
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Tremayne  et  al.,  2006).  As  a  consequence,  coalition  allies  should  also  be  more  closely
connected to each other than to the opponent side. As links thereby partially decide on the
attention allocation on the web, this form of internal coordination makes sure that the link
economy plays in favour of the own camp (Fisher et al., 2013). Finally, it is an open question
(as longitudinal studies of the web are rare) whether online contestation has a stable core (5)
– a last criterion for coalitions.
A Coalition’s Resources and their Origin
Coalitions  differ  in their  access  to  different  resources such as financial  means,  important
allies and their degree of support which influence their ability to push forward their core
ideas (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). We focus on two resources: a traditional one stemming
from the composition of allies and an online-specific resource, namely online visibility. A
coalition is regarded resourceful if it involves allies from the classical venues, i.e. media and
political actors into the coalition structure and if these allies are rooted on the national level.
Such actors have the capacity to push and accelerate the issue (Benkler et al., 2013). As most
studies  concerned with online  coalitions  or  networks  analyse  only  one  type  of  actor  our
knowledge on the composition of (counter-) coalitions is sparse. 
A second important resource of a coalition is its online visibility which allows 'to include and
exclude issues, frames and contributors' (Bennett and Segerberg, 2014: 424). Online visibility
is shaped by various forms of web connectivity (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). Hyperlinks –
the focus of this study – are one of the first,  yet still  important mechanisms shaping this
connective  fabric  of  the  web  which  today,  however,  have  been  complemented  by  more
participatory connective fabrics originating in the recommendation systems of social media
(Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). Hyperlinks play a dual role in shaping online visibility: they
decide  the  pathways  a  surfer  can  follow and shape  the  algorithmic  selection  (Gonzalez-
Bailón, 2009). Search algorithms are based on the idea that sites receiving many links are
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more important than those that gather only few of them. Moreover, if these links then stem
from  highly  visible  actors,  the  importance  is  further  increased  (Brin  and  Page,  1998).
Following this  line of reasoning, links influence on the web 'who gets  the pole position'
(Gonzalez-Bailón, 2009: 271) or as Ackland and O’Neil (2011) put it who receives authority.
It has to be noted, that this attention economy is independent of the evaluation a link contains.
Thus, also critique links foster visibility. As visibility is even more important in the multi-
channel  information  environment  online  compared  to  traditional  mass  media  (for  which
researchers claim that even negative visibility fosters success (e.g. Ellinas, 2010)), we regard
the receiving of links as an important resource of a coalition. 
Studies that focus on the overall hyperlink structure of the web have revealed that visibility
online is unequally distributed. They have shown that few very popular actors receive most
links whereas the bulk of actors within the networks are marginal (Barabási, 2003; Gonzalez-
Bailón,  2009;  Hindman,  2009;  Kim et  al.,  2010).  These  hierarchical  structures  resemble
scale-free power-law distributions and are the result of linking behaviour that preferences
sites that are already well connected (preferential attachment, see Barabási and Albert, 1999).
As an often overlooked consequence, hyperlinks are just as concentrated as traditional media
(Hindman, 2009) and in the end only few actors are able to profit, in terms of visibility, from
the advantages of online communication.
Thereby, research points out that it is not necessarily the elites that turn most visible online
(yet, for evidence of online elite dominance, see e.g. Gerhards and Schäfer, 2009; Gonzalez-
Bailon, 2009), but it may well be those challenging a societal master frame (we will refer to
them  as  counter-movements  here).  Benkler  et  al.  (2013) for  example  illustrate  how  a
countermovement online wins against one of the best-funded lobby organizations in the US
in the case of online piracy regulations whereas Bennett and Segerberg (2013) analyse how
movements like the Occupy or Indignados profit from online communication. Kaiser et al.
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(2017)  show  that  the  far-right  in  the  US  managed  to  influence  the  more  traditional
conservative media via Breitbart during the US election campaign 2016. The significance of
the  Internet  for  counter-movements,  however,  has  not  only  been  shown  for  established
democracies, but also for countries which experience more governmental control. Looking at
China,  for  example,  Peng  has  shown  that  online  discourse  has  contributed  to  trigger
governmental actions  (Peng, 2005) whereas Zhou and Moy’s study  (Zhou and Moy, 2007)
indicates that online communication helps pushing neglected issues on the traditional media
agenda.  Further  on,  it  is  revolutionary  periods  (like  the  Arab  spring),  in  which  online
communication  has  contributed  to  sustain  and accelerate  the  countermovement’s  protests
(e.g. Wolfsfeld et al., 2013). 
Based on such studies, authors have formulated their hope that the online world leads to a
democratic  power  reconfiguration  (Bentivegna,  2002;  Kellner  and  Pierce,  2008):  'The
networked public sphere is an alternative arena for public discourse and political debate, an
arena that is less dominated by large media entities, less subject to government control, and
more  open  to  wider  participation.'  (Benkler  et  al.,  2013:  5).  More  recently,  however,
researchers and politicians have started to realize that also counter-voices which oppose basic
democratic values  (see for the concept of bad civil society Chambers and Kopstein, 2001:
839) and / or replace factual through post-factual information (see e.g. House of Commons
Home Affairs Committee, 2012; Silber and Bhatt, 2007) exploit the possibilities of the Web.
The most prominent example, in this vein, is probably the Islamic State which some even
claim would never have 'come into existence,  let  alone been able to survive and expand'
without digital technologies  (e.g. Atwan, 2015: 9). Yet also within the Western world such
counter-voices have gained ground: the alt-right sphere in the US (Benkler et al., 2017), the
climate skeptics (e.g. Schäfer, 2012; Elgesem 2017) or the anti-vaccination movement (e.g.
Guidry et al. 2015; Basch et al., 2017) might serve as prominent examples. 
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Although  we know that  online  visibility  is  unequally  distributed  and that  under  specific
circumstances even challengers may become visible, we lack a full understanding as regards
the origins of such visibility. Visibility derives from acts of strategic hyperlinking (Young &
Leonardi, 2012) which takes over a gatekeeping function in structuring the web (Dimitrova et
al., 2003). When deciding on whom to link to, like-minded and trusted actors are privileged
(Author, Park & Thelwall, 2003; Elgesem, 2017) whereas links to those whom one seeks to
“exclude  […]  from the  discourse  due  to  differences  in  the  way  they  conceptualize  the
underlying  causes  and  the  particular  solution  to  the  problem”  are  avoided  (Young  &
Leonardi,  2012:  236,  see  also  Rogers  & Marres,  2000).  However,  with  its  focus  on  the
direction  of  link setting,  this  research only partially  reveals  the origins  of visibility  as  it
largely  ignores  the  quantitative  differences  in  the  link  setting  activity  of  proponents  and
opponents. An exception is Kaiser’s (2017) study on the commenting activity of different
camps  that  shows  that  those  challenging  the  mainstream  are  more  actively  engaged.
Similarly, Ackland and O’Neil (2011) show that splits within the environmental movement
lead to differences in subgroup visibility, what they refer to as “index authority”, which refers
to the fact that central actors in hyperlink networks will be ranked higher in search engine
indexes. Jackson and Foucault Welles (2015) in turn use the concept of “crowdsourced elites”
to refer to the fact that the features and affordances of online communication allow dissenters
to organically create central actors in networks of political disputes – activist organizations,
independent  media  and  individual  citizens  –  who  surpass  traditional  elites  in  terms  of
visibility. 
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Case Selection and Methods
Case Selection
To study online contestation among competing coalitions, we analyze the issue of climate
change in Germany and the United Kingdom from June 2012 to May 2013. As an issue,
climate change presents clear-cut political divisions, which result in two core policy beliefs.
Such beliefs separate those who see the anthropogenic contribution to global warming as a
problem – climate advocates – and thus follow the scientific consensus formulated by the
IPCC (IPCC, 2013) from those who, to varying degrees, dispute the extent to which human-
related activities affect the climate and/or the seriousness of its consequences – the climate
skeptics. We have chosen these two countries in the specific time period of 2012 /13 as here
climate advocates (still) hold a policy monopoly in traditional venues, dominating climate
politics, parliamentary debates, traditional media as well as public opinion (although climate
skeptics  have  gained  some  visibility,  e.g.  Brunnengräber,  2013,  Painter  &  Gavin,  2016,
Carter & Clements, 2015). In climate politics, both countries had been at the international
forefront of cutting greenhouse gas emissions and energy use, while working on effective cli-
mate policies as well as the introduction of renewable energies (German Watch, 2013). The
dominance of the advocates’ camp is also reflected in parliamentary debates during this time
period where only few skeptical frames become visible (Author). In 2012 /13, climate advo-
cates also dominated the traditional media. AUTHOR for example shows that around 75% of
all articles about climate change in the UK and around 70% in the German press do not con-
tain any skeptical arguments. Finally, a closed-up view on public opinion indicates that a
large majority in both countries follows the climate advocates: 83% in the UK and 90% in
Germany agree that climate change is a fairly or very serious problem (European Commis-
sion, 2011). In sum, the comparative research design chosen nicely reflects policy monopo-
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lies on climate change in both countries – an ideal setting to study the role of the Internet for
counter-coalitions. 
Collecting data: applying link tracing and content analysis
To identify the involved coalitions and to describe coalitions’ resources and their origin, we
rely on link tracing and content analysis applying a five-step procedure. First, our link tracing
approach starts  from the eight  most  important  civil  society  actors  in the field of  climate
change in each country – four of them are climate advocates and four climate skeptics.ii Fol-
lowing Kriesi (2004) civil society actors pursue specific political goals, yet lack institutional-
ized access to the political process. They have been chosen as starting points as they link to a
variety of actors (Rogers and Marres, 2000), as they are the 'champions of online communi-
cation' (Schäfer, 2012: 530) and they are the ones most likely challenging the policy monopo-
lies. To identify which civil society actors serve as source seeds, we relied on a literature re-
view and combined it with expert interviews and country-specific Google searches on climate
change and global warming (with deleted search histories). Selecting equal numbers of advo-
cates and skeptics in each country we aim for capturing the full ontology of online contesta-
tion giving both sides equal starting positions. 
Second, we make use of a web-crawling software, called the IssueCrawler  (Rogers, 2010).
For each country, this crawler starts from the eight selected source seeds and collects all hy-
perlinks that point to other websites for which the crawler then – in a second step – checks for
links running between them. We have chosen a snowball procedure because it allows us to
identify cross-camp linking. Beyond, we have limited the crawler setting to follow only one
step out as pre-studies have revealed that further steps out primarily find irrelevant pages, i.e.
pages that do not deal with climate change. As web-crawlers are blind to the fact whether the
included pages actually deal with the issue under consideration, we have indexed all crawled
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pages in a third step according to our keywords.iii Only those pages that contain our keywords
remain in the network. 
To allow for a better analysis of the networks, we have added a fourth step of data prepara-
tion. As we are interested in actors as the nodes of our networks and not in networks connect-
ing single web pages, we have aggregated an actor’s single web pages and sub-domains. Be-
yond, we have deleted the most marginal actors requiring that an actor within the network
contains at minimum two links - one of them must be an inlink meaning that an actor is rec-
ognized at least by one other actor within the network. In addition, we have dichotomized the
networks so that per crawl only one link at maximum runs between a pair of actors. This is
necessary as the number of links is very much dependent on the construction of the webpages
itself. Additionally, for blogs we have deleted all links stemming from the blogroll thus only
focusing on links within the use text. Finally, we have stacked the resulting networks that
were collected once per month in an eleven-month period. By stacking the networks, we see
how often a specific actor appears in the network (between one and 11 times). The stacked
networks serve as the basis for the analyses and contain 361 unique actors in Germany with
3667 links and 353 unique actors in the UK containing 6609 links.iv
Fifth, we have analyzed all actors within the network with a quantitative content analysis. For
the coding we used the information found on the 'About us' pages or similar sections of the
website. The analysis was conducted by two coders. A master-coder reliability test revealed
satisfactory results with Krippendorff’s alpha averaging .90. We thereby classified each actor
according to the political position advocated, the geographical area he/she is most active in
(e.g. Germany, UK, US, global) and the actor type he/she belongs to (e.g. political actors,
media, civil society, bloggers). In the coding instructions we clearly indicated that an actor’s
self-categorization determines its classification. To identify the political position of the media
we coded at minimum three editorials dealing with climate change. If all sampled editorials
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show a clear-cut position pointing in the same direction, this position was attributed to the ac-
tor; otherwise a no-position category was attributed.  Analyses describing the coalitions as
such (Hi* index, vitality and composition scores) are based on actors with a political position
only (Germany: 335; UK: 312). 
Coalitions’ identification, resources and their origin
Following the idea of Sabatier (1988) the primary feature of a coalition is its belief system
based on shared core (policy) ideas and values. To identify the core ideological dimension of
coalitions we rely on content analysis data, i.e. the coding of an actor’s political position. As
a result, we classify actors as climate advocates, climate skeptics or no-position actors. Al-
though the ideological core beliefs are central to demarcate coalitions, Sabatier (1988) as-
sumes that coalition members also show some form of  coordination. We use hyperlinks to
study such  coordination.  Coordination  is  indicated  if  more  links  run  among like-minded
actors than to those having other political positions (see also Elgin, 2015; Fisher et al., 2013).
We can expect  this  requirement  to  be  met  due  to  the  principle  of  homophily  in  linking
behaviour  and as otherwise the linking economy of the web would play against  the own
camp. To measure how strongly links refer to allies and how strongly to opponents, we rely
on the homophily index Hi*  (Ackland, 2013; Currarini et al., 2009). This index relates the
links within a group to those from the group to others and adjusts for the group size. The
index has the advantage that it is not dependent on the number of actors in the two opposing
camps, and that it is standardized between -1 and +1. A value lower than 0 means that the
actors of a camp predominantly interact with opponents (heterophily, Monge & Contractor,
2003), while values greater than 0 mean that they primarily relate to those of their own group
(homophily).
Finally, we can only speak of coalitions if they show some stability in the course of time. To
measure stability of coalitions we analyze how often a coalition member shows up in the net-
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work in our eleven-month period. This so-called vitality score of each actor thus varies be-
tween 1 and 11 with the latter indicating that an actor is always present in the network. As
there is no clear standard against which we can judge whether we find 'enough' stability to
speak of coalitions, we regard it as sufficient if we find a core of allies in each coalition that
is present through all of the points in time.
To measure coalitions’ resources, we study the composition of coalitions as well as at their
online visibility. Regarding composition, we rely on content analysis data indicating the de-
gree to which political actors as well as (traditional) media are members of coalitions and
how strongly they are rooted in the national arena. For the online visibility, we look at the de-
gree distribution, i.e. indegree  (Burt, 1976) and eigenvector distributions (Bonacich, 1972).
The indegree measure simply counts the number of links an actor receives whereas the eigen-
vector centrality evaluates those links as more important that stem from actors with high on-
line  visibility  themselves.  To evaluate  the online visibility,  we first  compare  the  average
recognition of coalition members of climate advocates and skeptics. As average scores might
be misleading due to variation in coalition size, we analyze in a second step, which coalition
manages to have the most visible actors within our networks. 
To identify the origins of visibility, we combine an analysis of the direction of link setting
(i.e. towards the own or opponent camp) with the absolute amount of link setting activity of
an actor (i.e. actors differing in their quantity of link setting). 
Results
Identification of coalitions
The data clearly support the idea that online contestation is structured by coalitions. First,
more than 88% of all network actors in the British network and more than 92% in the Ger-
man network formulate a clear-cut political position which supports the relevance of belief
systems. Not surprisingly in light of the existing policy monopolies in both countries, the
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number of climate advocates is more than double as high as that of climate skeptics (UK: 218
advocates versus 94 skeptics; Germany: 242 advocates versus 93 skeptics, see for a visualiza-
tion Figure 1 & 2 in the Appendix). 
Analyzing the interaction patterns of climate advocates and skeptics shows that links running
among like-minded actors outnumber cross-camp linking, which suggests some form of inter-
nal  coordination. This tendency towards homophily can be expressed by the index H (Cur-
rarini et al., 2009), developed further by Ackland (2013, p. 100) to take into account the dif-
ferent size of the single groups. The corrected homophily index H* is thus defined as
H i∗¿(
si
si+d i
−
v i
v i+w i
)÷(1−
v i
v i+w i
)
Here, si are the ties internal to the group and di those connecting the group to others, while vi
is the size of the group and wi the size the rest of the population. Values greater than zero in-
dicate  homophily,  values lower than zero heterophily.  We can see from Table 1 that  the
camps in both networks show a substantial degree of homophily. However, these values are
indicative of a coalition only to the extent that they differ significantly from what would be
expected by chance, and we therefore compared the observed linking patterns for the two
camps in both of the networks with 1’000 random configurations for each of them. The simu-
lations were based on the actual networks in terms of the number of nodes and the number of
edges, which were distributed at random between the actors. For the UK and Germany, we
simulated the networks at each single point in time, stacked them, and then calculated the H i*
index for climate advocates and skeptics. The result is a distribution of Hi* index scores for
both countries and we then compared the empirical values to the means of the simulations,
finding that in each case the distances between them were greater than 20 standard devia-
tions. The introspective orientation of the actors in the camps can therefore be taken as a sig-
nificant marker of a coalition building process.
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[Table 1]
Finally, the last criterion stipulates that the camps display a certain amount of stability. While
all the camps are characterized by a substantial amount of fluctuation, Table 2 shows that sta-
bility does not decrease linearly, but rather describes an u-shaped curve that reveals a stable
core. We again used a simulation procedure to assess whether the stability dynamic we see at
work differs significantly from what would be expected by chance. We generated an n by m
matrix for each camp where the number of columns m equals the replications of the simula-
tion, 105 in each case, whereas the number of rows n equals the number of nodes in the camp.
Each node can take on a random value between one (lowest vitality) and eleven (highest vi-
tality), but the sums of the rows in each column must be equal to the sum of the observed vi-
tality values for each camp. We then summed the scores for each vitality value in the matri-
ces and compared the resulting distributions to the observed scores using a permutation test
with a chi-square statistic implemented in the wPerm package for R (Weiss, 2015). The re-
sults show that in each case the observed amount of stable allies in each coalition is signifi-
cantly higher than in the simulations, which supports the notion of at least stable coalition
cores. Note that due our filter criterion for the network (total degree of two, minimum of one
indegree requirement for each node) the source seeds need not be present at all points in time,
particularly if they lack an inlink.
[Table2]
Coalitions’ resources and their origins
To evaluate the online resources of the two coalitions, we first look at their composition (see
Table 3a, see actor types and b, see geographical origin). Not surprisingly, the counter-move-
ment coalition of climate skeptics in 2012/13 is primarily built upon non-established, Inter-
net-based voices, i.e. bloggers (whose share amounts to 55% among the UK skeptics and
48% among the  German skeptics)  and upon transnational  actors  of  the  English-speaking
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hemisphere (e.g. 38% of the skeptical actors in the British and 45% in the German network
come from the US). Yet, the counter-coalitions show surprisingly strong relations to the me-
dia. A closer look reveals that these links run primarily to conservative outlets having online
and offline presence (e.g. the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Times, Daily Mail, Daily
Express), but also to conservative online-only newspapers and magazines (e.g. Canadian Free
Press, American Thinker, Daily Caller). The mainstream coalition of climate advocates, in
contrast, is more strongly nationally grounded and composed of traditional civil society ac-
tors (whose share amounts to 51% among the UK advocates and 48% among the German ad-
vocates), mass media (29% in the UK, 25% in Germany) and to a lesser degree political ac-
tors (9% in the UK, 15% in Germany) which indicates stronger connections to traditional
venues (and also to a broader setting of mainstream media reaching beyond the conservative
sphere). Consequently, the mainstream coalition is more resourceful as regards allies.  
[Table 3a and Table 3b]
Comparing the average visibility of coalition members reveals that climate skeptics receive
around twice as many inlinks as climate advocates. The average climate skeptic in the UK
network receives 30 links within the stacked network whereas the average climate advocate
has only 15 – a difference that proves to be statistically significant (permutation testv, p-value
= 0.001).  Although the total amount of links within the German network is lower, the rela-
tionship remains similar: whereas climate skeptics have an average of 15 links, climate advo-
cates’ amounts to 9 (permutation test, p-value = 0.014).  Interestingly, these findings can be
replicated if the comparison is based on eigenvector centrality which indicates that climate
skeptics on average do not only receive more links but also receive more links from impor-
tant  actors (permutation test  Germany, p-value < 0.0001; permutation test  UK, p-value <
0.0001). These results are particularly relevant, since the size of the climate skeptic coalition
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in both countries is only ca. 40% of that of climate advocates and they would therefore be ex-
pected to have a lower average indegree.
In a second step, we analyze which coalition manages to have the most visible actors within
our networks. The analysis clearly shows that our networks fit the typical uneven distribution
of recognition: among the 353 (361) actors in the UK (German) network, it is 29 (30) who re-
ceive 50% of the links. Among them climate skeptics are strong. Among the 29 most visible
actors with the UK network, we have 15 skeptics, 12 advocates and 2 no-position actors.
Among the most prominent actors in the German network, we have 15 skeptics, 14 advocates
and 1 no-position actor.
The strength of climate skeptics becomes even more evident, if we look at the single most
important actors which by the way also constitute the stable core of each coalition. In the UK,
among the five actors with the highest online visibility based on indegree measures, we find
only climate skeptics with US and UK bloggers being most prominent (e.g.  Watts Up With
That? (US), followed by Climate Audit (US) and Climate Resistance (UK)). With far less on-
line visibility, it is the NGO Skeptical science and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change that follow on the advocates’ side. Yet, when looking at eigenvector values, it is also
Greenpeace and The Guardian that turn out to be important players supporting the advocates’
coalition. In the German network the dominance of skeptics is less pronounced when looking
at indegree values (although also here the US blog Watts Up With That? manages to be the
most important player) as here the NGO Real Climate, the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change and the  New York Times also play important roles. However,
when eigenvector values are taken into consideration, the most important actors are all from
the climate skeptics’ coalitions: it is once again two US players Watts Up With That? and the
International Climate and Environmental Change Assessment Project as well as a German
civil society group called EIKE.
COALITIONS AND COUNTER-COALITIONS                                                                                                                                 18
Turning finally to the origins of climate skeptics’ online visibility, Table 4 shows the average
link setting activity of coalition members and how it is directed towards the own or the oppo-
nent coalition. It indicates that in both countries climate skeptic allies have the highest link
setting activity. Skeptics in the UK (Germany) set on average 42 (20) links compared to 9 (7)
links stemming from an average advocate. As shown before each coalition privileges like-
minded actors with its linking behavior. The high activity of climate skeptics pushes thus
skeptics into the pole position of online communication (although their tendency to link to
like-minded actors is weaker compared to the advocates). Climate skeptics thus turn out to be
the true winners of online communication: they actively exploit the link economy of the web
and as a consequence get into the pole position there. While both camps display a tendency
towards preferential attachment (Barabási & Albert, 1999, see for empirical evidence Figure
3 in the Appendix), i.e. they have large proportions of low-degree nodes, which tend to build
ties to established ones, thus contributing to the “rich getting richer” phenomenon, there are
also important differences to note. Skeptics, more than advocates, profit from the higher share
of mid-degree nodes and particularly from the engagement of bloggers. Bloggers are predom-
inantly active on the skeptical side of the debate and contribute to creating “crowdsourced
elites” (Jackson and Foucault Welles 2015), that is, actors that command no substantial social
or political status outside these digital spaces, but nevertheless occupy a central position in
them.
[Table 4]
Discussion
Political  contestation in times where mainstreamers  hold a policy monopoly and counter-
voices are weak in traditional venues, has four characteristics in the online world. First, such
online contestation is structured by coalitions. Such coalitions are characterized by common
beliefs, coordination via hyperlinksvi, i.e. preferential linking patterns to allies, and a core of
COALITIONS AND COUNTER-COALITIONS                                                                                                                                 19
stable coalition members.  Second, our study shows that composition-wise the mainstream
coalitions are more resourceful also on the Web as they are better connected to traditional
venues. However, the counter-coalitions constituted primarily by Internet-based voices have
already established strong ties to one traditional venue, the conservative media landscape of
which at least a part has been shown to also push the climate skeptical views in their tradi-
tional media outlets (Author). Third, visibility-wise the counter-coalitions of climate skeptics
are in the pole position: with high average visibility and with outstanding visibility of individ-
ual coalition members they dominate the networks. Climate change communication in Europe
thus is another case where the Web makes the counter-voices profit. Fourth, the members of
the climate skeptical coalition are responsible themselves for being in the pole position on the
Web. Although within-camp linking is less pronounced among climate skeptics than among
the climate advocates, this seeming advantage of the climate advocates is more than balanced
by the extremely high online activity of the climate skeptical coalition. In contrast, the cli-
mate advocate coalition although it manages to ignore the climate skeptics, gains less visibil-
ity due to its lack of activity. It is thus not sufficient to silence the opponent camp by non-
linking if this is not accompanied by an active online strategy.
However, also this study has limitations. First, with its sole focus on hyperlinks as fabric of
the web, it neglects connections on the web that are shaped by a multitude of web users via
participatory features of social media platforms (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013). As social media
are on the rise, future studies must take this new fabric of the web into account and show how
it affects the role counter-coalitions can play in policy monopolies. Second, the present study
captures only part of the wider Internet. Although our pre-studies on crawler settings indicate
that crawls digging deeper into the web, do not add substantially to identifying relevant pages
for the issue under consideration,  we cannot  preclude that  the sheer quantity  of advocate
voices  being  present  on  the  wider  Internet  may  level  out  the  skeptics’  higher  activity.
COALITIONS AND COUNTER-COALITIONS                                                                                                                                 20
Whether skeptics thus are the absolute champions of the linking economy cannot fully be an-
swered; yet they are the ones actively exploiting the possibilities of the web. 
Besides analyzing how the participatory fabric of social media influences counter-coalitions’
role in challenging policy monopolies, our study opens up at least two further paths for future
research. How do such transnational counter-coalitions evolve? Do they contribute to diffuse
ideas  across  borders?  It  seems  that  transnational  allies  are  used  by  national  actors  to
strengthen their positions and form coalitions. However, to truly understand the development
of (transnational) coalitions, we need to understand the circumstances under which national
actors go transnational in the online world. 
Beyond, the question is open on whether and how the climate skeptical coalition can take ad-
vantage of its resources. Does online contestation influence for example classical mass media
or even the political process? Which role then do such online coalitions play in shaping pro-
cesses of agenda-building? We thereby assume that even if media and politics do not always
directly react to these counter-voices in the online sphere, such counter-mobilization in the
online world may have consequences.  From a minimalist  conception,  it  might serve as a
reservoir of ideas that are well maintained and already made socially acceptable among those
who distrust the mainstream – a societal tendency which is part of the diagnosed legitimacy
crisis of contemporary democracy (e.g. Mair, 2013) as well as of rising populist tendencies
(Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). This reservoir might be activated and built upon as soon
as a window of opportunity opens up in other venues (see e.g. the withdrawal from the Paris
accord of the recent US administration). Yet, such consequences might even spread further.
Centola et al. (2018) have shown that committed minorities which constitute only 25% of the
population have the capacity to change the majority rules in an online setting. To establish the
conditions under which such tipping point dynamics also occur in non-experimental settings
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is important to understand the potential further spread of the ideas of a today’s minority, the
climate skeptics, who already actively exploit the web. 
Is the Internet thus a new venue for counter-voices? In the case of climate change communi-
cation, with networks originating from two countries where counter-voices are marginal in
traditional venues, the answer tilts more to a 'yes”. Although these counter-coalitions still do
not have similar connections to traditional venues as the mainstream coalition and although
they are still ignored by the dominant camp, they actively use the Web pushing themselves
into visibility. Thereby, they can draw on allies from countries where their position is not
marginal anymore. With the Web, we are thus only one click away from the firmest chal-
lengers in this field: the US climate skeptical movement. 
If the Web serves as a new venue for counter-coalitions, are then the hopes for a democratic
reconfiguration through online communication fulfilled? From a normative point of view, on-
line communication actually has potential: it allows new voices to be raised, old structures to
be challenged and new forms of cooperation and coordination to be established. However, al-
though most movement researchers have focused on the beneficial side of such mobilization
for democracy (e.g. Warren, 2000), researchers have also shown that such new voices might
challenge democracy (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). They do so, if they oppose democracy
as such, if they oppose some of its fundamental values (i.e. its liberal core) or if they confront
democracy with post-truth debates. In such debates long-established facts (e.g. based on sci-
entific evidence) play on equal ground with personal opinions and experiences and self-pro-
claimed expertise. The climate change debate, studied here, carries such post-truth character-
istics: it is the climate skeptics that continue to question well-established scientific evidence
that climate change is occurring, that mankind substantially contributes to it and that it has se-
vere consequences (IPCC, 2013). The Web eases such communication as everybody can raise
his/her voice without having to go through a filter of journalistic selection or political ratio-
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nality. However, thereby the web just offers a technical device: how this technical device is
used (and which messages are spread and turn prominent), depends very much on society. In
times, in which trust in established institutions is declining, those challenging these estab-
lished institutions and their views, have gained a new and powerful platform, the Web, to
raise their counter-voices. 
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Table 1 Observed and simulated H* index scores for advocates and skeptics in the UK and 
the German network
Camp Observed H* index Simulated H* index 
(mean)
Standard deviation 
(simulated H* in-
dex)
German advocates .706 -.074 .030
German skeptics .449 .028 .011
UK advocates .626 -.079 .021
UK skeptics .345 .034 .009
Note. German advocates, N = 242; German skeptics, N = 93; UK advocates, N = 218; UK skeptics, N = 94. 
Simulations for each camp based on 1’000 replications.
Table 2 Observed and simulated vitality distributions for advocates and skeptics in the UK 
and the German (DE) network (percentages in parentheses)
Vital-
ity
DE ad-
vocates
ob-
served
DE ad-
vocates 
simu-
lated
DE 
skep-
tics ob-
served
DE skep-
tics sim-
ulated
UK ad-
vocates
ob-
served
UK ad-
vocates 
simu-
lated
UK 
skep-
tics ob-
served
UK 
skeptics 
simu-
lated
1 88 (36) 4.4e6 (18) 32 (34) 1.4e6 (15) 74 (34) 2.0e6 (9) 27 (29) 6.6e5 (7)
2 43 (18) 6.7e6 (28) 24 (26) 2.3e6 (24) 27 (12) 4.0e6 (18) 10 (11) 1.4e6 (15)
3 26 (11) 4.3e6 (18) 7 (8) 1.7e6 (19) 18(8) 2.4e6 (11) 4 (4) 1.2e6 (13)
4 19 (8) 2.8e6 (11) 8 (9) 1.2e6 (12) 12 (6) 3.0e6 (14) 7  (7) 1.0e6 (11)
5 15 (6) 1.9e6 (8) 1 (1) 6.4e5 (7) 4 (2) 2.0e6 (9) 2 (2) 7.8e5 (8)
6 12 (5) 2.0e6 (8) 0 (0) 7.0e5 (7) 4 (2) 2.6e6 (12) 6 (6) 6.6e5 (7)
7 13 (5) 8.1e5 (3) 1 (1) 5.6e5 (6) 9 (4) 1.7e6 (8) 4 (4) 1.0e6 (11)
8 5 (2) 5.2e5 (2) 4 (4) 3.6e5 (4) 7 (3) 1.4e6 (6) 3 (3) 1.1e6 (12)
9 9 (4) 3.7e5 (2) 1 (1) 2.3e5 (3) 12 (6) 1.3e6 (6) 7 (7) 6.7e5 (7)
10 9 (4) 2.9e5 (1) 4 (4) 1.8e5 (2) 17 (8) 1.1e6 (5) 8 (9) 5.8e5 (6)
11 3 (1) 1.0e5 (0) 11 (12) 7.3e4 (1) 34 (16) 3.3e5 (1) 16 (17) 3.1e5 (3)
Chi2 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Note. German advocates, N = 242; German skeptics, N = 93; UK advocates, N = 218; UK skeptics, N = 94. 
Simulations for each camp based on 105 replications.
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Table 3a Composition of coalitions regarding actor types in percent
% UK Skeptics UK Advocates Ger Skeptics Ger Advo-
cates
Civil society 24.5 51.4 26.9 48.3
Bloggers 55.3 8.3 48.4 9.5
Media 17.0 29.4 21.5 25.2
Political actors 1.1 9.2 2.2 15.3
Others 2.2 1.8 1.1 1.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Note. Basis: UK: 218 advocates, 94 skeptics; Germany: 242 advocates, 93 skeptics
Difference regarding actor-type between Skeptics and Advocates Chi-square test: UK: X-squared = 360.09, df =
9, p<0.001; Germany: X-squared = 333.03, df = 9, p<0.001. Also supported by Fisher’ Exact Test. 
Table 3b Composition of coalitions regarding geographical origin in percent
% UK Skeptics UK Advocates Ger Skeptics Ger Advo-
cates
UK 27.7 36.2 15.1 5.8
Germany 1.1 0.9 12.9 26.9
US 38.3 27.1 45.2 23.6
Australia 6.4 2.3 4.3 4.1
Canada 7.4 0.9 8.6 1.7
Global 9.6 28.9 3.2 30.2
Other 9.5 3.7 10.7 7.3
Total 100 100 100 100
Note. Basis: UK: 218 advocates, 94 skeptics; Germany: 242 advocates, 93 skeptics
Difference regarding actor-type between Skeptics and Advocates Chi-Square Test: UK: X-squared = 251.08, df 
= 9, p<0.001; Germany: X-squared = 294.31, df = 11, p<0.001
Table 4: Average link setting activity of coalitions
Skeptics Advocates No position ALL
UK Skeptics 23.0 15.7 3.4 42.1
UK Advocates 1.7 6.9 0.5 9.1
Ger Skeptics 12.8 5.9 1.4 20.1
Ger Advocates 0.5 6.5 0.2 7.2
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Note. Basis UK: n = 218 advocates; n = 94 skeptics, n = 41 no opinions; basis Germany: n= 242 advocates, n =
93 skeptics, n= 26 no opinion; Permutation tests skeptics to skeptics vs advocates to advocates: UK, p-value <
0.0001; Germany, p-value = 0.117
i Our coalition framework differs from traditional party coalitions as coalitions in our conception 
contain more than party actors. Advocacy coalitions, however, share much in common with Diani’s 
idea of social movements (Diani, 2001) which has been adapted to the online world by Ackland and
O’Neil (2011), i.e. the shared sense of identity, the connection through hyperlinks and the engage-
ment in a specific issue conflict. Social movements, however, differ from our coalition approach as 
they are composed of social movement organizations and activists only whereas advocacy coali-
tions can contain all types of actors. 
ii For Germany: Advocates (Greenpeace, Klima der Gerechtigkeit, Potsdam Institute of Climate Im-
pact Research, WWW Germany), Skeptics (Analyse + Aktion, EIKE; klimaskeptiker.info, klima-
ueberraschung.de); for the UK: Advocates (Greenpeace, Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, WWF), Skep-
tics (The Global Warming Policy Foundation, Global Cooling & New Ice Age, Climate 
Resistance,repealtheact.org.uk).
iii For Germany: 'Klimawandel,' 'globale Erwaermung,' 'globaler Erwaerumng,' 'globalen Erwaer-
mung', for the UK: climate change and global warming (see for similar search terms e.g. Elgesem et
al., 2015)
iv These aggregated numbers are based on 11 stacked networks per country. The minimum, maxi-
mum and average case numbers for the single networks are given in the following: Germany 
[nodes: min = 60; max = 135; mean = 102.27, sd = 33.47; edges: min = 165; max = 480; mean = 
333.36; sd = 100.20]; United Kingdom: [nodes: min = 146; max = 170; mean = 156.91; sd = 8.19; 
edges: min = 493; max = 736; mean = 600.82; sd = 73.24]
v The permutation tests here and elsewhere were conducted in the statistical software environment 
R, using the 'perm' package (Fay & Shaw, 2010).
vi Of course we are aware that coalitions are bound together by multiple relations 
(Simpson, 2015) that might well go beyond hyperlinks. In this vein, one major caveat of our study 
is that we have not looked at social media. However, as actors are active on all venues, also such a 
partial approach might capture the relevant characteristics of online contestation (see for a similar 
argument Benkler et al., 2013).
Online Appendix – additional results: 
Table 3a
Online value of UK coalition members
UK_Sceptics
Indegre
e
Eigenvecto
r
Vitalitä
t
Country Type
Watts Up With That? 232 0.36656526 11 USA 5
Climate Audit 173 0.28664258 9 USA 5
Climate Resistance 159 0.38608637 11 UK 5
Roger Pielke Jr.'s Blog 139 0.23871835 11 USA 3
Committee For A Constructive 
Tomorrow 122 0.27010626
11 USA 3
Real Climategate 84 0.17078441 11 USA 5
JunkScience.com 78 0.12189359 11 USA 5
International Climate and 
Environmental Change Assessment 
Project 76 0.19594279
10 USA 3
Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide 
and Global Change 65 0.12653042
11 USA 3
The View From Here 65 0.16206099 8 CA 5
GREENIE WATCH 54 0.11367963 10 AU 3
International Climate Science Coalition 49 0.11577724 10 Global 3
No Frakking Consensus 46 0.18271551 9 CA 3
MailOnline 41 0.07304213 11 UK 4
Nongovernmental International Panel 
on Climate Change 37 0.04893148
10 Global 3
Alex Cull: My Articles and Reviews 36 0.13046005 11 UK 5
Australian Climate Madness 36 0.17383303 9 AU 5
The Register 34 0.0673738 11 UK 4
Bishop Hill 33 0.21034838 11 UK 5
Climate Etc. 33 0.19140728 11 USA 3
De staat van het klimaat 10 0.14782985 10 NL 5
Climate Lessons 31 0.13559918 6 UK 5
The Reference Frame 10 0.12604152 10 CZE 5
Climate Science: Roger Pielke Sr. 13 0.12147315 11 USA 5
UK_Advocates
Indegre
e
Eigenvecto
r
Vitalitä
t
Country Type
Skeptical Science 100 0.24451336 11 AU 3
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 78 0.15163611
11 Global 1
DeSmogBlog 66 0.23783721 11 CA 3
The Guardian 66 0.38644308 11 UK 4
Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature 59 0.12033296 9 USA 3
George Monbiot 51 0.19531882 11 UK 4
campaigncc.org 44 0.14316653 11 UK 3
Open Mind 37 0.08472858 11 USA 5
Stop Climate Chaos Coalition 33 0.1369516 11 UK 3
Women´s Environmental Network 31 0.14981072 11 UK 3
Climate Science Rapid Response Team 29 0.10150851 11 USA 4
icount.org.uk 27 0.1125226 9 UK 3
AirportWatch 26 0.21128668 11 UK 3
UK Climate Impacts Programme 25 0.10648218 10 UK 3
International Programme on the State 
of the Ocean.org 24 0.06634455
8 Global 3
Rabett Run 22 0.11396877 11 USA 5
biofuelwatch 21 0.09877638 7 Global 3
Greenpeace UK 20 0.47713351 11 UK 3
Plane Stupid 20 0.13510007 9 UK 3
World Development Movement 20 0.10225991 5 UK 3
Whatyoucando 12 0.1332238 10 UK 3
Collide-a-Scape 1 0.13058144 7 USA 4
Public Interest Research Centre 2 0.11421342 10 UK 3
No2NuclearPower 10 0.11403531 10 UK 3
BBC AU 0.1070248 11 UK 4
Mother Jones 10 0.10693655 11 USA 4
Note. Basis: UK: 353. Type of actor: 1 = political actor, 3 = civil society, 4 = media, 5 = blog.
Table 3b
Online value of German coalition members
DE_Sceptics
Indegre
e
Eigenvecto
r
Vitalitä
t
Country Type
Watts Up With That? 148 0.44946051 11 USA 5
International Climate and Environmental
Change Assessment Project 77 0.3043673
11 USA 3
NoTricksZone 64 0.20954591 11 DE 5
JoNova: Science, carbon, climate and tax 57 0.20575291 8 AU 5
Science and Public Policy 54 0.17057784 10 USA 3
Committee For A Constructive 
Tomorrow 51 0.16656838
7 USA 3
the Air Vent 50 0.27060497 11 999 5
Shub Niggurath Climate 47 0.22246489 11 999 5
No Frakking Consensus 41 0.19035643 10 CA 5
Climate Audit 39 0.2026712 11 USA 5
Nongovernmental International Panel 
on Climate Change 39 0.12862049
11 Global 3
Die kalte Sonne 38 0.14990433 11 DE 5
MailOnline 36 0.11045301 10 UK 4
Klimaüberraschung 24 0.09909341 11 DE 5
The SPPI Blog 24 0.29467425 11 USA 3
EIKE - Europäisches Institut für Klima 
und Energie 23 0.31969914
8 DE 3
EUReferendum.com 22 0.08620676 9 UK 5
Real Science 19 0.05806676 5 USA 5
Science Skeptical Blog 18 0.14153533 10 DE 5
KlimaNotizen.de 16 0.05520511 8 DE 5
New Zealand climate change 14 0.16300751 11 NZ 5
Bishop Hill 5 0.08355908 4 UK 5
DE_Advocates
Indegre
e
Eigenvecto
r
Vitalitä
t
Country Type
RealClimate 102 0.23277034 10 Global 3
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 80 0.17640407
9 Global 1
The New York Times 78 0.22947325 11 USA 4
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 75 0.1206474
10 Global 1
DeSmogBlog 36 0.13616486 9 CA 3
Skeptical Science 34 0.04553891 4 AU 3
The Guardian 34 0.16470861 10 UK 4
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V. 29 0.6175651 10 DE 3
Grist Magazine 28 0.12215842 9 USA 4
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research 28 0.08570614
7 DE 3
Klimafakten.de 27 0.23277034 11 DE 3
chinadialogue 22 0.11774352 10 Global 3
Klimaretter.info 20 0.16812891 11 DE 4
The World Bank Group 20 0.08614568 8 Global 1
Science 19 0.09601994 9 Global 4
BBC 18 0.11005158 10 UK 4
ClimateEquity 18 0.10687631 7 Global 3
Süddeutsche Zeitung 18 0.09216242 10 DE 4
The Hill AU 0.1263556 10 USA 4
Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung 16 0.08772654
9 DE 1
Greenpeace USA 9 0.14394473 9 USA 3
Note. Basis:, Germany: 361 actors. Type of actor: 1 = political actor, 3 = civil society, 4 = media, 5 = blog.
Online Appendix
Figure 1. Stacked hyperlink network of climate advocate and climate skeptical coalitions of 
the German crawls. Node size is proportional to indegree, edge size is proportional to weight. 
Colors: grey = climate advocate, black = climate skeptic. Basis: 242 advocates, 93 skeptics.
Figure 2. Stacked hyperlink network of climate advocate and climate skeptical coalitions of 
the UK crawls. Node size is proportional to indegree, edge size is proportional to weight. 
Colors: grey = climate advocate, black = climate skeptic. Basis: 218 advocates, 94 skeptics.
Figure 3. Cumulative indegree distribution of climate advocates and climate sceptics in the 
UK and the German network.
Note. Axes are on a log-log scale. Basis UK network: 218 advocates, 94 skeptics. Basis 
German network: 242 advocates, 93 skeptics.
